

PART IV

**UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM: FIFTY YEARS
AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION**

EDITOR'S NOTE

Ukrainian nationalism is still alive. Fifty years of Bolshevism, using every weapon in its armory have failed to kill it.

The Ukrainian cause is not a terminal case.

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UKRAINE: THE SPECTER OF NATIONALISM

From its inception, the Soviet Union has been haunted by the specter of nationalism. Now, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, the regime is still worried about the same, old, partly real, partly imaginary enemy. Official speakers still call on good Soviet citizens to be watchful and resist "recurrent bourgeois nationalism." Indeed, the nationality question in the Soviet Union, allegedly solved "once and for all on the basis of Lenin's policy" (Khrushchev, 1956), remains the greatest single obstacle to the creation of a "uniform community . . . advancing toward one goal, communism."

Today, nationalism manifests itself in the main in the resistance of the non-Russian groups to the swamping of their languages and cultures by the Russian. In some of the small but resilient federal republics, in Latvia, Armenia or Turkmenistan, for instance, such resistance has been remarkably effective. Even though Moscow has established a system of bilingual schooling with Russian as the first language, and *Pravda* and *Izvestia* have from time to time hailed the scheme as a huge success, the Russian language still is not much used. In Latvia, for instance, one-third of the school children now attend the bilingual

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schools. Yet a Ukrainian traveller, who was there as recently as last spring, noted with some awe that in Riga everybody spoke Latvian. Similarly, only Lithuanian was spoken in Vilnius.

This is not so in Kiev, capital of the Ukraine. People who speak Ukrainian in their homes prefer to use Russian in the streets in order not to arouse "the older brother," as the Russian authorities are called. Ukrainian caution in this regard undoubtedly stems from their long experience with purges of nationalists, some of which were also directed against the Politburo and members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. What is permissible in Russia, Latvia or Georgia could be a capital crime in the Ukraine.

A new generation of Ukrainians, however, free of the inhibiting experience of the purges, is coming to the fore in every field. The clandestine writers of Russia have defended the rights of the individual against collectivist dictatorship; Ukrainian clandestine literature nearly always refers to national freedom and dignity as well as to the rights of the individual.

The best known of the Ukrainian underground writers is Vasyl Symonenko (he died in 1963 at the age of 29).¹ He lashed out at the "hypocrites . . . who are trying to turn Marxism into a religion and a procrustean bed for science, art and love . . . No single teaching can monopolize the intellectual life of Man." In his poems he denounced the Stalinist system that robbed the people of their dignity and reduced the peasants to becoming petty thieves of their own grain—the system that put unlimited power into the hands of little men.

In one of his poems he insisted on the right of Ukrainians "to converse with their Mother-Ukraine" without any interference from either Russia or the United States. Once at a public reading of his poems, he was asked what kind of independence he envisaged for the Ukraine. He replied, "I know only one Ukraine." Among friends he expounded the idea of a neutral Ukraine, and a specifically Ukrainian road to socialism.

Symonenko's poems and his diary were published posthumously in 1965.² At the time, a professor of Kiev University, Ivan Svitlychny, and a Kiev critic, Ivan Dzyuba, were accused of having helped to smuggle the anti-Soviet material abroad. Symonenko's mother was induced to declare in *Radianska Ukraina* that her son had been a faithful communist and had

never intended to publish the poems or the ill-conceived diary. His friends, she said, were responsible for the mishap. These accusations coincided with the preparation of the Siniavsky-Daniel trial. Because the fate of the two Ukrainian critics received world-wide publicity, they have since been released.

Their detention, in any case, must also have had a good deal to do with their own non-conformist writing, some of it published in Ukrainian magazines in Warsaw and in Presov, Czechoslovakia. In fact, they never confessed to having any part in the Symonenko case.

The arrest of Svitlychny and Dzyuba climaxed a two-year-tug-of-war between the authorities and the youth of the Ukraine.³ The year before, a fire had destroyed the library of the Academy of Sciences in Kiev and with it about 600,000 titles of Ukrainian literature. It was said in Kiev that the fire department arrived mysteriously late and without the necessary equipment. An employee of the library was charged with arson. A protest pamphlet that circulated in the Ukraine claimed that the trial, conducted in secrecy without press coverage, was a farce.⁴ Pohruzalsky, the accused, was reported to have been indignant at the charges brought against him; after all, he said, many Ukrainian books had been systematically destroyed before and no one had been tried for it. A copy of the pamphlet eventually landed in the office of UNESCO director René Maheu.

Soon after, there was the Shevchenko incident. Each year a singing crowd gathers at the Taras Shevchenko monument in Kiev on May 22, to commemorate the transfer, in 1861, of the hero-poet's remains from Russia to the mound on the bank of the Dnieper. The czarist regime of those days had forbidden any manifestations of Ukrainian feelings. Now when Shevchenko monuments adorn Kiev and Moscow (and Winnipeg and Washington), it is once more "an offense to the great Russian people" to sing songs at his monument. A score of students went to jail for not heeding the ban. In the wake of the disturbances in Kiev and Lviv there followed more arrests, mostly among students and intellectuals. *Pravda* took note of this and charged that historians and party leaders in Lviv were responsible for the renaissance of nationalism among Ukrainian youth.

Although the arrests had been made in secrecy so as not to awaken the curiosity of the foreign press, a large crowd gathered

on the day when the group of prisoners was transferred by train from the Lviv prison to a camp in the interior of the Soviet Union. The prisoners were showered with flowers. Militia-men dispersed the crowd with fire-hoses which, on this occasion, were there on time and ready to operate.

Ukrainians have suffered too much from war and purges to engage much in the kind of daydreaming about revolution in which the *emigres* indulge. But events show that the nationality question has not been solved in the Soviet Union, not even to the degree that it has been in Tito's Yugoslavia. The people of all the republics quietly and stubbornly resist the Party's attempts at Russification disguised as promotion of "internationalism and Leninist friendship of people." In fact, the policy breeds more nationalism than it cures. There is one difference, though: The new nationalism seems to be free of the old violence-breeding fanaticism; in a way, it is political. A young Soviet Ukrainian explained it thus: "We grew up in the Soviet system and we have learned from Marxism about the common interests of working people. From our experience under the Nazi occupation we have learned to combat every kind of fascism. Under Stalin and his like we have learned to recognize the meaning of Lenin's warning to the Party about Great-Russian chauvinism... we want to be the equals of 'older brother' in the Union, and masters in our own republic. We have nothing to lose in this confrontation but our bondage; and we can regain our dignity as individuals and as a nation, exactly in the Leninist meaning..."

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See note 5 to article No. 12 in this collection.

²*Ibid.*

³See note 6 to article No. 12 in this collection.

⁴For a complete text of the protest pamphlet, see *Suchasnist* (Munich), V, No. 2 (February 1965), 78-84. For an English text, see article "There'll Always be a Shevchenko," *Atlas* (January 1966), pp. 36-38.

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

Fifty years ago this month, two strikingly different political entities rose from the ruins of the Czarist Empire. The forces of social change in Russia led to the establishment of a totalitarian Bolshevik state on November 7, 1917; social revolution in the Ukraine, with strong nationalist undertones, resulted in the proclamation, on November 20 of that same year, of the Ukrainian National Republic modelled on the British and Swiss democracies.

A conflict between these new structures was inevitable. Lenin recognized the Ukrainian Republic on December 17, 1917, but almost in the same breath he ordered the Red Guards to attack it from without and within. By then a general disillusionment with Russia had set in among the Ukrainians. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the Ukraine's first President, explained their dilemma: "We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian people would find the requisite conditions for its manifold development. Now we have become convinced that our ways differ from those of Russia, whether reactionary or revolutionary... the Ukraine has always stood in her history, culturally and poli-

tically, nearer to Western Europe. . . . If we wish to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we must conform to the civilized West. . . .”

The West of the time had, however, little understanding of the aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities and attempted to support the idea of a united non-communist Russia. The ill-advised interventions of the Allies, like the earlier meddling of Germany, helped only the Bolsheviks, who suddenly appeared as the defenders of the people’s “revolutionary gains.” Thus the cause of the non-Russian peoples was lost.

The lesson of the almost three-year-long war between Russia and the Ukraine was not lost on Lenin. Recognizing the strength of nationalism, he agreed to the formation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, associated with Russia but having the right of secession. The same system was used with respect to Belorussia and the Trans-Caucasian Federation.

The formation of the essentially centralist Soviet Union, in 1922, deprived the Ukraine of her attributes of sovereignty won in 1919: the rights of amending her own constitution, determining her frontiers, conducting foreign relations, organizing her armed forces, regulating her finances, and passing new legislation. With the ascendancy of Stalin, the centralist noose tightened even more. In 1937, the Kiev government comprised only six unimportant commissariats; its chief function was to rubber-stamp the decrees of Moscow and administer them. The Ukrainian Constitution reflected these basic changes in the Soviet Union; the confederation became in effect a monolithic Russian super-state.

By 1934, the central Politburo had restored as official doctrine the old nationalist concept of a single Russian people with a common history. The October Revolution was declared to be a Russian phenomenon with national purposes. Any manifestation of patriotism by non-Russians was branded as “bourgeois nationalism” and a crime against socialism. History was rewritten to show that the annexations of borderlands by czarist Russia merely represented progressive steps in the development of these countries and of Russia as a whole. Thus the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement between the Ukraine and Muscovy was interpreted as a voluntary and permanent union of the two peoples.

Moreover, Russian newspapers and schools were rapidly being

established in the Ukraine. Teachers, writers and artists were to glorify not only the communist system but also the traditional heroes of Russia. Dictionaries were rewritten to draw the Ukrainian language closer to the Russian. Those unwilling to submit were eliminated. In 1934 alone, 79 Ukrainian scholars and writers were shot and many others sent to concentration camps in Asia. The Great Purge of 1937 obliterated “an entire generation of political leaders, economic experts and cultural workers,” says a historian of the period. The wholesale destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry had already been accomplished, in 1933, when over five million died in the famine resulting from the forced collectivization of farms.

Admittedly, the Ukraine’s early communist leaders did make some effort to stem the centralist tide. Mykola Skrypnyk,¹ for instance, was an Old Bolshevik but he insisted on the “Ukrainization” of both the party apparatus and the administration in the republic; the Ukrainian language was to be the first official language. But in the early 1930’s the Ukrainian Central Committee lost out in a struggle with Moscow against the harsh economic plans. Some of the Committee members thereupon committed suicide, others were deported or shot. Until 1953 no Ukrainian was allowed to occupy the post of First Secretary of the party in Kiev. According to Djilas, Yugoslav communist leaders took warning from this demise of the Ukrainian party officials; during their conflict with the Kremlin, in 1946, they refused to go to Moscow for fear they, too, would not come back alive.

In 1941, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union’s border territories, there were mass surrenders by units of the Red Army, Russian as well as non-Russian. But the Germans themselves were responsible for the turning of the tide. The atrocities they committed in the occupied countries impelled the people to fight for their survival on the Soviet side. The Ukrainians fought valiantly. Their achievements at the front, the existence of Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas (UPA), and the increasing restlessness in the Ukraine compelled Stalin to make some concessions. In 1944, the Soviet Constitution was amended to restore to the Ukraine and other republics the right to form their own departments of defense and foreign affairs. But only the Ukraine and Belorussia were sponsored by the Soviets as founding members of the United Nations. However, neither of the two repub-

lics has been recognized by any foreign nation, nor does Moscow encourage the idea. There have been feelers from the British and Sudanese governments which were silently rebuffed in the Kremlin. A feeble attempt by the Premier of the Ukraine, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, to deal directly with foreign diplomats stationed in Moscow, led to his dismissal in 1963. Though he is now again at the helm in Kiev, he failed to obtain Moscow's permission for the Ukraine's participation in Expo 67 as a separate exhibitor. Such participation would have entailed a state visit to Canada by the Ukraine's representative and Moscow could not tolerate that. Recently, Alexei Kosygin declared that "no country in the world could claim to have solved the nationality problem as successfully as the Soviet Union. . . . No nationality in our country is discriminated against." The continuing evidence of underground ferment in the Ukraine makes nonsense of this boast.

True, the policy of Russification and economic integration is eroding the Ukraine's national identity, but there is still strong resistance to this process. That it exists, was recently revealed by a writer in the Russian-language paper *Pravda Ukrainy*: "We still meet people who consciously or sub-consciously stress national differences and individuality, thus hampering the progressive processes of drawing together nations and cultures." Behind these lines lies a story of continuing national consciousness among the non-Russians in spite of all "unifying" measures. In 1966, some 30 Ukrainian intellectuals and students were arrested and deported to Russia.² Earlier, a group of Ukrainian jurists had met the same fate for having prepared a brief calling for the practical implementation of the Ukraine's paper constitutional rights. There exists in the Ukraine a large clandestine literature similar to that in Russia.³ Hand-produced articles, plays, poems, and stories circulate constantly, which cannot pass the censors of the state publishing organizations. Some of this material has reached the West and appeared in print; more is in process of being printed. The authorities clamp down with arrests and trials, but the young writers show a stubborn integrity.

Last May, there was a sit-in protest at the Taras Shevchenko burial mound on the Dnieper, and an even larger demonstration in Kiev. Students, who composed the majority of the demonstrators, raised demands that sound somewhat strange coming from

citizens of a country where, supposedly, "the nationality problem has been solved." They wrote: "We demand the introduction of the Ukrainian language in all schools in the Ukraine, from kindergarten to university, as well as in all public institutions, from local town halls to ministerial offices." They also demanded minority rights for the seven million Ukrainians in the Russian Federation, deprived of their own language schools and newspapers while the Russians in the Ukraine enjoy all the privileges of a dominant race.

The older people, with long memories of purges and harsh suppressive measures, shake their heads in apprehension when young people state these problems so openly. But a member of *Komsomol* (the Communist youth organization) explains: "Why should we be afraid? To demand one's own rights is not a crime. And we are demanding only what is ours according to the promises made to our fathers and grandfathers in 1917. Why should we go on being cautious? There is a limit to cautiousness and after 50 years in the shadows the Ukrainians have reached that limit. . . ."

Are the leaders of the Soviet Union aware of the dangers inherent in the policies of rigid Russification and economic centralization advocated by the Russia diehards in the party? A year ago, *Pravda* warned that "total disregard for national characteristics could bring in its wake a dangerous outburst of the old nationalistic spirit." The fact is that this nationalistic spirit is still very much alive in every Soviet republic, despite the passing of 50 years since the Bolshevik Revolution.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹M. O. Skrypnyk (1872-1933), Soviet Ukrainian party and government functionary; an associate of Lenin; identified with the so-called "Ukrainization period" in the Ukraine in the 'twenties and regarded as a leading Ukrainian national communist. Disillusioned, he committed suicide as the first phase of the Stalinist purges was getting under way.

²See Chapter V in this collection.

³See article No. 24 in this collection.

PART V

INTELLECTUAL DISSENT IN

THE UKRAINE

EDITOR'S NOTE

A new movement appeared in the Soviet Union. Call it, if you like, "intellectual dissent." It can be found among the Russian intelligentsia; it has had manifestations also in non-Russian republics, like the Ukraine.

The main vehicle of communication is samizdat (in Russian) or samvydav (in Ukrainian); meaning literally, self-published literature.

Examples are, the Russian-language "Chronicle of Current Events" and the Ukrainian-language "The Ukrainian Herald." In the Ukraine (and in other non-Russian republics), dissent has had a particular dimension: the defense of national rights, culture, and heritage in the face of Russification. The regime's response to this movement has taken the form of a variety of punitive measures. Some of Roman Rakhmanny's writings on the subject, by unusual paradox, exist in the Ukraine possessing a self-published literature of her own.

"EXCHANGE ALONG THE 50TH PARALLEL"

Of my nearly 500 commentaries published here in the last ten years, perhaps one-tenth reached the Ukrainian readers in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Along with other "imported" writings, such as General D. Eisenhower's speech at the unveiling of the Taras Shevchenko monument in Washington and Pope John's encyclical, the articles were multiplied and circulated in typed and longhand transcripts by friends, among friends and for friends.

Mykhailo S. Masiutko, a teacher from the Crimea, was one of those accused of typing and distributing the "bourgeois nationalist literature from abroad." He argued both at the trial and in his letter to the attorney-general in Kiev that these essays were not anti-Soviet in content. "On the contrary, Rakhmanny in his article argues for strengthening and enlarging the powers of the present Soviet government in Ukraine," wrote Masiutko.¹ His co-defendant, Opanas I. Zalyvakha, an artist with a Siberian background, quotes from the same article a line saying that "we want to see the Ukrainian people masters in their own home and not just existing as an ethnographic non-entity. . . ."²

The article in question was prompted by a polemical message of Iryna Vilde, a Soviet Ukrainian novelist, who urged the

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Ukrainian Canadians in 1964, to face the truth and recognize the "flourishing Soviet Ukraine." I countered it by comparing the real autonomy of Canada's provinces with the paper sovereignty of the Ukraine in the Soviet Union, where (to quote Lenin) "only the Great Russians were privileged to form a sovereign state." Since 1914, when Lenin argued thus against Rosa Luxemburg, the situation has not changed, I charged in my "Open Letter to Iryna Vilde."³

The article found the mark not because it showed something new to the post-Stalin generation of Ukrainians, but because it happened to coincide with their own observations. They had seen and deplored the Russification of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania and other Union Republics; they objected, in their essays, to the witch-hunting against "bourgeois nationalists." "There are no bourgeois Ukrainians, no bourgeois Jews, no capitalist Tartars, no German landowners in the USSR. There are only workers," wrote Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky, a poet from Odessa.

Karavansky addressed a Petition to W. Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, and asked him to use his own influence to call an "international conference of the Communist parties of the world" in order to "define the principles of Marxist-Leninist nationality policy." The conference should "condemn anti-Semitism, Ukrainophobia, discrimination against nationalities" which are apparently practised by "various Communist parties."

(The Polish Consul in Kiev accepted the petition; the Consul of Czechoslovakia refused to forward a similar "appeal" addressed to the then President, A. Novotny.)⁴

For all his efforts to improve communist practices, Karavansky received a term of 8 years and 7 months in a concentration camp. About three months ago he was joined there by V. Chornovil, sentenced for three years, because he wrote the Ukrainian version of *Profiles in Courage*—20 biographical sketches of the dissenters.⁵

All these men and women, born and brought up under the Soviet system, have been particularly wary of the recurrent Stalinism in the Soviet Union. About seven million Ukrainians in the Russian Federation are still deprived of the language schools. "The privileged position of the Russian language in Ukraine

breeds chauvinistic elements," declared Mykhailo M. Horyn, a psychologist, who was sentenced to 6 years of hard labor.

Yet the defendants' stand, both during their trial and in the concentration camps, points explicitly to the essential change in the mood and the structure of the Soviet "society of societies." The new generation in all the republics believes in freedom of speech, freedom to criticize and freedom to travel, write, and paint according to one's own desires.

The fact that they have accepted favorably the views of some non-communist writers from abroad, and have themselves succeeded in sending out to the West their highly humanistic messages, is in itself a victory.

The exchange of ideas along the fiftieth parallel running between Canada and the Ukraine is convincing enough.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Vyacheslav Chornovil (comp.), *The Chornovil Papers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 144. See also, *Ukrains'ka intelligentsiia pid sudom KGB* (Ukrainian Intellectuals Tried by the KGB), (Munich: Suchasnist, 1970), pp. 90, 93-94, and 102.

²Chornovil, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

³For a text of the open letter, see *Suchasnist* (Munich), IV, No. 11 (November 1964), 122-27.

⁴Chornovil, *op. cit.*, p. 180-86.

⁵See article No. 22 in this collection.

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THE CHORNOVIL PAPERS AND INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY

*The Chornovil Papers*¹ is a compilation of documents dealing with the suppression of intellectual ferment in the Ukraine from 1965-67. Close to fifty Ukrainian writers, teachers, scientists and other members of the Soviet intelligentsia landed in the concentration camps of Russia in the winter of 1965-66, at the same time that two Russian writers, A. Siniavsky and Iu. Daniel, were on trial for their works published abroad. The trial of the Ukrainian intellectuals was never officially acknowledged.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, a 30-year-old reporter for Ukrainian radio-TV, was assigned to cover the secret trials at Lviv and Kiev, and in one case even to testify against a colleague on trial. He refused to take part in the "illegal proceedings" and was himself suspected and arrested. When released, he would not keep quiet about what he saw in the secret police offices, in the courtrooms and in the streets of Ukrainian cities.

In his Petition addressed to Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukraine's Communist Party, and in his sketches of "Twenty Criminals," Chornovil raised some probing questions about Soviet society and the Stalinist policy of intimidation of Ukrainians, carried out under the cover of silence in both the press and radio-TV services.

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"When I began writing these notes," Chornovil says, "I had just one purpose in mind: to warn against the repetition (under different labels) of the terror of the 1930s." For all efforts to improve the so-called Leninist justice in the Ukraine, Chornovil got three years of imprisonment, later commuted to 18 months. Presently he is being held in Vynnytsia not far from Lviv where the Russians proposed recently to hold a two-party meeting with the leaders of Czechoslovakia about the "dangers of liberalization" which, allegedly has spread to Ukraine.²

But in the meantime Chornovil's friends, who had copies of his "notes," have managed to send them abroad to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary, to acquaint all their comrades with the recurrence of Stalinism in the Ukraine. Two or three copies reached North America, appeared in excerpts in various papers, and have finally been published in book form.

This book shows again that it is not enough to be a "good communist" but one has to be a loyal Russian as well. "For five years I studied faithfully Marxist-Leninist philosophy—just recently I passed my Master's exam in that philosophy. Then, all of a sudden and quite by accident I lay my hands on a Ukrainian book published abroad and I am accused of being a bourgeois nationalist. . . or I listen to a speech by the Pope on the radio and I become a Jesuit. . . or I read a leaflet from Peking and I become a follower of Mao Tse-tung. . . ." Chornovil wrote the above about himself and other Ukrainian intellectuals accused, among others, of transcribing and circulating one of my articles.

The readers of that article and its author alike held the view that Ukraine, being a developed country with vast resources and technical knowhow, could be an independent country. If Belgium "enjoys independence: why does not the Soviet Ukraine," Mykhailo Ozerny, a teacher argued before his class, and for his views he was sentenced to six years of hard labor, although the Soviet Constitution guarantees the right of secession to the Ukraine and other Soviet non-Russian republics.

There were many other gross transgressions of the Soviet law by the present rulers of the Soviet Union. A reader will find it a fascinating experience to follow Chornovil's reasoning based on the law, the constitution, and Lenin, and aimed at the defense not only of Ukrainians, but of all the non-Russians discriminated

against: Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Jews, Tartars, Moldavians and the Volga Germans.

Among various statements in defense of the freedom of peoples and of individuals, the most striking ones are those by S. Karavansky and I. Dzyuba. The former indicts the Russian government for their suppression of peoples, and the latter calls for cooperation between Ukrainians and Jews on the basis of their mutual interest and similar sufferings.

The book is in want of an editorial hand, to make the reading more understandable to a person not familiar with the events. Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn of Yale University does not help much in this respect with his over-cautious introductory article. The whole issue is presented much more clearly and concisely by Z. Brzezinski of Columbia University. "Fifty per cent of the Soviet people is non-Russian. Among these, the Ukrainians are the most numerous and potentially the most powerful. It is not inconceivable that in the next several decades the nationality problem will become politically more important in the Soviet Union than the racial issue has become in the United States," says Professor Brzezinski.

In addition to being a moving human document, *The Chornovil Papers* focusses attention on this important political issue: intellectual ferment is a sure sign of the maturing of the non-Russian nationalities, some of them asking for greater autonomy within the Soviet Union and some eyeing their own road to self-government.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Vyacheslav Chornovil (Comp.), *The Chornovil Papers* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). 246 pp.

²V. Chornovil was released from imprisonment on February 3, 1969, after serving 18 months of his three-year sentence. He was not allowed to work professionally as a journalist or literary critic, and had to earn his livelihood as a railroad worker. In January 1972, he was arrested again on charges of continued dissident activities and sentenced in February 1973 to 7 years of severe regime labor camp and 5 years of exile.

UKRAINIAN WRITER DZYUBA CRITICIZES RUSSIFICATION

Another book written by an Ukrainian writer, Ivan Dzyuba, has been recently smuggled out of the Soviet Union and put into the hands of Western readers in an English translation.¹ Ivan Dzyuba's study implies that the more Russia changes the more it remains the same, at least, in its relations with its non-Russian territories.

Lenin tried hard to change this relationship and promised along with a just society for the working classes, self-determination for the oppressed non-Russians. But on his death-bed, in December 1922, he had to admit his failure on both counts. The ageless Russian bureaucracy, sprinkled only by a few internationalists of his kind, took control over the peasants and workers while the chauvinists in the party reverted to the familiar method of forced assimilation of the non-Russians. In his last three letters to the Central Committee, Lenin warned against the mistake of following these diehards whom he had dubbed scornfully "Russian *derzhimordy*" or big bullies. Soon after, however, Stalin was building up his personal power using these very elements in the party and state administration.

Now, 45 years since Lenin's warning, this 37-year-old Ukrain-

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ian writer charges that the present-day Soviet leaders are continuing the anti-Leninist policy of Russification of the Ukraine. The arrests carried out in various Ukrainian cities in the fall of 1965 prompted him to voice his own warning. The victims then were young Ukrainian intellectuals who expressed their dissatisfaction with the colonial-like status of their republic. Dzyuba, in an extremely well documented essay, defends their right to "feel anxiety about the fate of Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian nation," threatened by annihilation as much as all the other, and much smaller, non-Russian nationalities of the USSR.

"The idea of assimilation of nations, the idea of a future nationless society is not an idea of Scientific Communism, but of that kind which Marx and Engels called 'barrack communism,'" writes Dzyuba to the Soviet leaders, one of whom Petro Shelest² of Kiev, has made a reputation for himself as a "hawk" of the Politburo during the recent Czechoslovak crisis.

In the spirit of that reactionary tradition, Soviet leaders have been busy promoting a process of Russification which is marked by its own "special mechanics," says Dzyuba. First of all, there is what he calls "the language blockage." Commercial relations in all republics are conducted mostly in Russian. The party, Communist Youth League, trade unions, factories, business and educational institutions "prefer" Russian to any other language. The Soviet Army remains the most powerful instrument of the process, as its language of instruction and command is Russian only, and its military traditions and aims are those of Russia.

The so-called Soviet-Ukrainian schools "do nothing to instill a sense of national dignity and feeling. . . . They do not even assure for the pupils a minimal knowledge of Ukrainian history and culture."

But even these inadequate schools are few. In 1958, relates Dzyuba, "even in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev, there were only 22,000 pupils in Ukrainian (secondary) schools but 61,000 in Russian schools." In such large cities as Kharkiv, Odessa or Donetsk, secondary Ukrainian schools are rather an exception, says Dzyuba, himself a native of the industrial region of Donbas.

At the same time, economic over-centralization works against the development of the Ukraine as a distinctive nation. "In our country detailed economic statistics are for some reason kept

behind a triple lock and key. . . . Till 1958, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic did not compute its national income or national product."

Although Russians, and their Ukrainian collaborators in official positions, do their utmost to convince the Ukrainian public that their country gained from "the union with Russia," the Ukrainians appear to be more and more aware of their colonial status within the Soviet Union and since the ferment among the intellectuals more and more people are questioning the policy of "merging of nationalities."

Ivan Dzyuba, a sincere believer in Marxist-Leninist principles, has a warning for all those who have been trying to improve on Stalin. "He destroyed several million Ukrainians but did not destroy the nation. And no one ever will. You cannot go against history. . . . You cannot play at communism: you either have to put it into practice or betray it in the name of the one and indivisible barracks."

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: Weidenfeld-Nicholson, 1968), 240 pp. Also, 2nd rev. ed., 1971.

²Petro Iu. Shelest, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (1957-72); member of the CC CPSU (1961-73) and of its Presidium, later renamed Politburo (1964-73). In May 1973, demoted and removed from his posts in the Politburo, CC CPSU and Soviet Government after being accused of being "soft on Ukrainian nationalism." See also article No. 27 in this collection.

CLANDESTINE SOVIET PAPER TELLS ALL

A promise of dignity and human rights for everyone, in a future just society under the flag of communism, was what made the Internationale a truly inspired anthem of the underprivileged population of Russia half a century ago—then in the throes of revolution. The song made the people aware, more than anything else, of their own self-sufficiency by proclaiming to all and sundry that their salvation was to be achieved, not through God, the czar or a hero, but through their own efforts alone.

Today, some 50-odd years later and with communist order well-entrenched in eight other countries of the world, the people of the Soviet Union are still pursuing the same elusive objective. And they are doing this literally (to borrow the phrase from the Internationale) “with their own hands.”

To inform one another, and perhaps world opinion as well, about their grievances and the shortcomings of the Soviet system in the field of human rights, a group of public-minded citizens of the USSR is publishing a typed newsletter, *Samizdat* Chronicle, and circulating it clandestinely from hand to hand.

Samizdat means literally “self-publishing,” and its implications are obvious. The state, controlled by the Communist Party, owns all the means of publishing—from newsprint to the

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distribution of printed items. Not a word can appear in print without being passed through the sieve of censorship. Thus, the only way to express oneself freely or to inform the public about some events, in the country or abroad, is to put out your own pamphlet or a newsletter.

Limited Means

To a prospective self-publisher there are very limited technical means available. The simplest to operate are typewriters and mimeographs, but even these are not easy to obtain. No wonder then, that Ukrainian dissenters had to turn to the pre-Gutenberg practice of copying their uncensored writings in longhand. For this effort, some of them were sentenced at a secret trial at Lviv, 1966, to up to seven years of hard labor.

Samizdat Chronicle differs from other self-publishing enterprises in that it is a newsletter of 15 to 20 pages, typed on regular size paper. The issues published during 1968 bear the heading: “The Year of Human Rights in the Soviet Union—A Chronicle of Current Events.” Under the heading, there is a quotation from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

The invisible editors of the Chronicle appear encouraged by the response of their readers to this effect. “After the publication of five issues,” they wrote in the December, 1968, issue, “it is now possible to have at least a general idea of the manner in which human rights are suppressed in the USSR. This being so, not a single member of the Movement (for Human Rights) can regard the Year of Human Rights as over. The over-all objective—democratization—and partial task, fulfilled by the Chronicle—information—remain unchanged. Therefore, the Chronicle shall continue to appear in 1969.”

Keeps Going

And they were true to their word. The Chronicle has kept on this year, with a slightly adjusted letterhead: "The Year of Human Rights in the Soviet Union Continues." But the same quote from the Declaration of Human Rights proclaims the right of every man to possess his own views and to express them either in private or in public, by any means and anywhere.

The language of the publication is Russian, in this case a *lingua franca* for readers of various nationalities both within and without the USSR. As to contents, the Chronicle is packed with reports on Soviet violations of human rights, regardless of the victims' nationality, race or belief.

Czechoslovakia's occupation by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its allies occupied a central spot in the Chronicle's reporting last year. This year, the plight of the Crimean Tartars and thwarted Ukrainian aspirations, both cultural and political, are much in the limelight. Brief sketches of more prominent defenders of human rights in the USSR are presented along with information on suppressed publications. The April 1968 issue contained a brief review of other *samizdats* and their contents: discussion of arrests, protests, and social, literary and religious questions.

The editors of the Chronicle are extremely well informed about happenings in distant centers and regions of the USSR, including the concentration camps of Mordovia, and prisons in Russia and the Ukraine. They give a special report on Ukrainian and Russian prisoners' tribulations—ranging from stricter incarceration, through transfers to other camps and prisons, to (rarely) their release after sentences have been served.

Religious Persecution

There are also news items dealing with the renewed persecution of Baptists and Catholics in the Ukraine. "In January this year, the acting head of the clandestine Ukrainian Catholic Church, Bishop Velychkovsky, 70, was arrested."¹ This followed arrests of lower clergy and believers in the Western Ukraine.

A striking violation of human rights is presented by the ad-

ministrative measures directed against those who had ventured to express in public (orally or in print) nonconformist opinions on current Soviet affairs or literary questions. Among those expelled from the Party or *Komsomol*, or fired from their jobs, for these transgressions, are journalists, teachers, artists, writers, engineers, scholars, factory workers and students.

The editors of the Chronicle, without displaying any emotions, record also the tragic self-immolations by those Soviet citizens who could not bear the pressures of the totalitarian system any more. Thus, in April this year, a student in Riga, Ilija Rens, set himself on fire while displaying under this city's Statue of Liberty a placard with the inscription: "Freedom for Czechoslovakia!" His self-immolation has been preceded by a similar protest in the Ukraine: Vasyl Makukha, a teacher and father of two children, committed suicide by fire in a Kiev square last December, shouting "Freedom for the Ukraine."

Despite its contents and the irregular manner of its publication and distribution, the editors do not regard the Chronicle as illegal. They see only its "working conditions being limited by the peculiar concept of legality and freedom of information formulated in the years past by certain Soviet organs." Only for this reason, say the editors, are they unable to print their address like any other journal in the Soviet Union.

Chain of Contacts

But readers interested in making their Soviet society better informed, about events both in their own country and abroad, "should deliver to the Chronicle any pertinent information available to them." This can be done with the help of the very person "who has supplied you with a copy of the Chronicle; the same person will forward your report to his own contact. . . ." But there is a warning, too: "Do not try to follow up the whole chain of contacts by yourself because you may be suspected of being a police informer."

Thus, apparently, a chain reaction of thinking freedom-loving persons is being promoted from the murky depths of the totalitarian society. These public-spirited citizens, by acting as readers and correspondents at the same time, are trying hard to become

better informed themselves and to share their knowledge with fellow citizens, concerning the state of human rights under the red banner.

By their unpretentious reporting and devotion to the truth, the editors of the Chronicle have succeeded in imbuing their readers with a feeling of optimism, in spite of all the shocking details about the seemingly invincible power of the regime. The reader is becoming aware of the multitude of honest people like himself, who are displaying such courage and human dignity that even an all-powerful Soviet state machine has not been able to intimidate them.

Opinion Growing

The significance of *Samizdat* Chronicle is unequivocal: within the realm of the Kremlin, public opinion is growing steadily and it is already challenging the community of totally enslaved minds.

The situation is not unlike the one that had developed in Russia under Czar Alexander II, slightly over 100 years ago. One of the best minds among the dissenters of that period (the 1860s), Nikolai Serno-Solovevich, described the mood of society then in the following words, very applicable to the Soviet Union today:

The present government awakened society with its partial reform measures, but did not give it an opportunity to express itself. But the need for expression is as important for society as chatter is for a child; therefore, society could not do anything else but to express its opinion, without waiting for permission to do so.

And this is why the march for human rights in the Soviet Union goes on.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Bishop Vasyl Velychkovsky of Lutsk (Ukraine), secretly ordained in 1963; twice imprisoned by the Soviet authorities (1945-1955 and 1969-1972); released from the USSR in 1972; died in Winnipeg, Canada in 1973.

25

WIVES OF SOVIET DISSIDENTS LEAD A DIFFICULT LIFE

Of all the underprivileged women in the world, the wives of Soviet dissenters merit the most commiseration, for their lot is tragic.

They live in an industrially developed country and, theoretically, have all the guarantees of equal rights with other citizens. However, the wives of Soviet dissenters feel compelled to fight for the liberation of their husbands who are imprisoned in various camps in the Soviet Union.

Their devotion is not even appreciated in their own country and remains almost unknown beyond its borders. But that their husbands deserve such an effort, most have no doubt. The dissenters are the men who not only believe in the principle of human rights but also have dared to challenge the authorities in the Soviet Union.

Thus, in the last eight years or so, such names as Daniel and Siniavsky, Solzhenitsyn and General Grigorenko, Moroz¹ and Karavansky became familiar to many a Canadian. But very few if any know the names of the women who stood by them in their most difficult moments when each wrestled in his mind with the human dilemma: to speak or not to speak against injustice. Or when the KGB men knock at a dissenter's door in the small hours

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of the night. Or when, months later on, in the courtroom where the government would hold a public trial to which even the defendant's wife may not be admitted.

But these women — wives, as well as mothers and sisters — chose to stand by their men when they have been sent away to prison for three to 15 years of imprisonment and hard labor, often supplemented by additional years of banishment from their region.

To stand by an arrested or sentenced man in the Soviet Union means literal hell for a woman. One becomes an undesirable social element in the eyes of the party. No publicity is involved. The woman soon must vacate the job she held before her husband's trial; a loss of living quarters is not rare. Children are discriminated against in school or at work. Existence on the brink of starvation is the only future for the dissenter's family. Relatives and friends remain to the dissenter's wife the sole hope for survival.

And yet, the wives of Soviet dissenters — be they Russian, Latvian, Ukrainian, Estonian, Jewish, Lithuanian or Tartar — find the necessary strength of spirit to defy their fate. They simply won't abandon their men.

Court appeals are sought. Petitions composed with the help of friends are sent to the attorney-general, to the republican legislatures and, eventually, to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

If this fails (as usually expected) appeals to prominent men of letters, to state-recognized artists and influential party members are directed. The rightful case of the imprisoned man is expertly laid bare. The argument usually rests on constitutional rights, the criminal code and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was endorsed by the Soviet Union in 1948.

Typed and hand-written copies of all these memoranda, appeals, petitions and protests — circulated from hand to hand — bring a moral pressure on the authorities. Soon, appeals addressed to the United Nations and "open letters" to humanitarian or professional organizations abroad appear both clandestinely in the Soviet Union and in some newspapers of the West. For idealism and faith in "international justice," these documents have no equal.

Through each document a fleeting image of a dissenter's wife seems to emerge, worn out with the struggle but still undaunted,

as, for instance, Zinaida Grigorenko. After her repeated appeals to the authorities to release her 64 year-old husband kept in the mental hospital at Cherniakhovsk (formerly the East Prussian town of Insterburg), she addressed her plea to the world's psychiatrists:

Who will stop this gradual murder? Evidently, in our country there is no such (legal) body. That is why I am appealing to you and pass on the request that my husband conveyed to me at my last meeting with him: 'Demand the repudiation of the false medical diagnosis on me, demand my immediate release.'

So did Giuzel, wife of historian Andrei Amalrik who was sentenced last November to three years in a hard labor camp.² She wrote to the Supreme Soviet: "I know my husband's strength of mind. Neither accusations nor conviction will break him mentally. But I also know that his health is poor and I fear for his life."

Soon, however, she had to turn to public opinion abroad: "All those who cherish the right of man to express views freely and to live in dignity, I am calling to help me."

The wives of Ukrainian dissenters have been even less fortunate. Their lot is reflected in the words of Raisa Moroz wife of the Ukrainian historian whose name came to haunt even some Canadian politicians on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. In her appeal to the Soviet Ukraine's boss, Petro Shelest, she wrote in October 1970:

For four years I and my little son had been waiting for my husband, and the boy's father, to return from the imprisonment which had been inflicted upon him — as many people say — for more than dubious reasons. Now again, we are facing long years of separation. . . . Is it really necessary for the construction of the most just and humane society in the world?

Similar irony underlies the dignified and factual appeals by Nina, wife of Svyatoslav Karavansky: there was actually no case against this poet and translator who had already spent 15 years

in Stalinist prisons. His “crime” was that he raised, in writing, the issue of discrimination against minorities in the USSR—the Jews, the Baltic nationalities, the Tartars, the Volga Germans—as a concomitant of the Russification being imposed on the larger nationalities, the Ukrainians and Belorussians, by the Kremlin.

And one is awed by the audacity of M. Ozerny’s wife, a doctor herself and mother of two little boys. Already restricted in practicing her profession, because of her husband’s arrest, she found it very hard to survive. She did not lose either her courage or dignity when she witnessed the court proceedings against her husband. After many months as a prisoner, he broke down and, in his concluding plea, asked tearfully for leniency. Mrs. Ozerny called out to her husband across the courtroom: “Mykhaile, don’t cry!”

(High school teacher M. Ozerny got six years in a hard labor camp for discussing a hypothetical question in his history class: “If such a small country as Belgium is a sovereign nation, why is it that the Ukraine—a country comparable to France—is not? . . .”)

Mrs. Ozerny’s behavior recalls to our memory those women in the Soviet Union who are also in prison.

Daria Husiak³ and Halyna Didyk⁴ have been already 21 years in Soviet prisons for having dared to attend to the wounds of the Ukrainian resistance fighters. Kateryna Zaryts’ka-Soroka,⁵ another movement supporter, has been 24 years in the “tombs of stone,” to use S. Karavansky’s description of Soviet prisons. They were joined there by hundreds of younger Ukrainian women who recently chose to stand up for human rights of Ukrainians.

There are thousands of men in the Soviet Union whose defense of human rights, for man and nation, is in itself a victory of the human spirit over the Soviet system. One must not forget that along with them, often standing by their men, there have been women—wives, mothers, and sisters—whose unpublicized self-sacrifice has made their men’s feat possible.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See article No. 26 in this collection.

²Andrei Amalrik, author of the book *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 94 pp. Amalrik was released and allowed to emigrate; he now lives in the West.

³Daria Husiak, a member of the Ukrainian resistance movement, condemned to death in 1950, later commuted to 25 years of imprisonment; released in 1975 at the expiration of her term.

⁴Halyna Didyk, condemned to death in 1950 for her role in organizing Red Cross units for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), commuted to 25 years of imprisonment; released in 1971 as a second class invalid after having served 20 years of her term.

⁵Kateryna Zaryts’ka-Soroka, helped organize Red Cross units for the UPA; in 1947 was sentenced to death, later commuted to 25 years of imprisonment; released in 1972 after having served her full term. Her husband, Mykhailo Soroka, died as a political prisoner in a Soviet labor camp in 1971. See article No. 29 in this collection.

26

MOROZ ROCKS THE EMPIRE OF SOVIET COGS

No other Soviet dissenter has ever spurred on so many young Canadians to appreciative re-thinking of their own democracy or to acting on his behalf as did Valentyn Moroz.¹

The 35-year-old history teacher, now behind the bars of the prison in Vladimir (one of the toughest in Russia), never set his eyes on Canada's capital.

Yet, his name has been cropping up in news reports from Parliament Hill; it rings in every city the Soviet premier visits during his Canadian tour, and it must have been mentioned more than once in the conversations Mr. Trudeau and Premier Kosygin had on the two touchiest issues—the demanded migration rights for the Soviet Jews and the release of Ukrainian intellectuals from Russia's prisons.

(The assurance that the latter issue would be raised during the Ottawa summit was given by Mr. Trudeau to a group of Ukrainian-Canadian students, who had been on a four-day hunger strike just before the Prime Minister was to address the Congress of Ukrainian-Canadians in Winnipeg, October 9, 1971).

Recently, one of Moroz's essays—"A Report From the Beria Reserve"—has been published in Israel by a group of immigrants from the USSR.

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But a year ago nothing seemed to suggest his tremendous impact on so many young minds in so many different countries. Until then, he had been somewhat overshadowed by the dissenters whose works appeared abroad: by Vyacheslav Chornovil whose uncensored report on the secret trials at Lviv of 1966—*The Chornovil Papers*—was published in Toronto; and by Ivan Dzyuba whose study *Internationalism or Russification* was published in Britain.

Born in 1936, Moroz was fortunate to survive the Second World War and the hunger and terror years in the post-war Ukraine. He was teaching history in the College of Education at Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine, and preparing his doctoral thesis when the KGB arrested him on the trumped up charge of "spreading anti-Soviet ideas" in 1965.

For four years he toiled in a forced labor camp of Mordovia where many Ukrainian, Jewish, Lithuanian and other "thinking people"—including such Russians as A. Siniavsky—have been compelled to slave.

But these years were not entirely wasted for Moroz, a Soviet-educated man who was also able to think for himself.

There and then, he enriched his understanding of the government system he calls "the empire of cogs." The experience resulted in "Report From the Beria Reserve," one of the most soul-rendering essays to come out from under the pen of a Soviet dissenter.²

"Stalin did not believe in cybernetics. But he has greatly contributed to this branch of science; he invented the programmed man. Stalin is the inventor of the human cog," wrote Moroz.

In a satirical manner, he explained how that came about.

"Once, the separation of the individual from the mass of matter signalled the beginning of life itself, the birth of the organic world. Presently, however, a reverse process began: the blending of the individual into the greyish mass—a return into solid non-organic and non-individual existence. Society has been overpowered by the inertia of facelessness. It is a crime to have a personality of one's own."

That is why Moroz and other imprisoned dissenters had been repeatedly asked by their interrogators to explain what seemed a puzzle to them: "Who do you think you are to yearn to become an individual in this society?"

Cogs Hypocritical

As intended, this essay, written in the nooks and crannies of a slave labor camp, reached the ruling circles in Kiev and was also brought to the attention of all the members of the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Soon after, typed and written copies of the document began circulating all over the republic. Even more timid from among the older generation would nod in agreement while reading a line like this one:

The ageless question — ‘Whither should I proceed?’ — has been transmuted for the cogs (in the USSR) into a formula that requires no mental effort: ‘Wherever they deign to order me.’

A writer himself, Moroz lashed the hypocrisy of the established Soviet writers, Russian and Ukrainian alike.

“The cog writes angry poems about the ashes of Buchenwald. . . . But the ashes of the victims burnt in the Siberian tundra do not affect the cog at all.”

Neither do such programmed men notice another incongruity of their wretched existence, wrote he with scorn:

All of us condemn the Nazi crimes perpetrated on the Jews but, at the same time, we all stroll coolly on the sidewalks paved with the tombstones which had been torn out of the Jewish cemeteries in quite a few of our towns. . . . Lecturers and postgraduate students had been walking over these flattened tombstones. . . . If by now some of them have obtained their Ph.D. degrees, then maybe even full professors are strutting over the names of the dead.

Moroz (whose name in English means “frost”) has no pity, especially for the self-adjustable cog, the ideal Soviet creature who has no thoughts, no convictions or desires of its own:

“An obedient drove of cogs may be named a parliament or a scholarly association, and none of them would ever cause any problems or surprises. A cog that was appointed a professor or academician, will never say anything new. If he happens to as-

found someone, he will change his views with a lightning speed — within a day. A group of the cogs appointed to the International Red Cross will count calories in the diet of some African tribes but won’t ever mention the starving people in their own country.” In different Soviet Republics, that is.

Some of the former inmates of Soviet concentration camps are, perhaps, the most miserable of all the programmed men in the USSR, observes much saddened Moroz: “When a cog is released from prison, he immediately will write that he never spent any time there; he is apt even to call as liars those who had demanded his release.”

But Moroz himself would never follow that well-trodden path of a regular Soviet cog.

After his release, in the fall of 1969, he kept expressing in public his strong beliefs in the dignity of men and their right to have their own personalities. Many regular cogs witnessed a senseless destruction of Ukraine’s historic sites and cultural monuments by the officials who hate anything individual — be it an artifact, a person or a nationality. But it took a thinking man, Valentyn Moroz, to register a public protest against the barbarity.

In his essay “Chronicles of Resistance in the Ukraine” he noted that there was more involved in the people’s defense of their customs and folklore than it appeared.³ The people opposed the official attempts at creating a pseudo-universal society which Moroz described thus:

America represents a deculturation process of all the ethnic elements that get into that melting pot. The Soviet Union, while entirely differing from the USA in other respects, has this one thing in common. . . . If you want to prove that you are ‘a progressive,’ you must disown your ancestry and quickly become ‘a universal person’ which in practice means a Russian.

In his last essay, “Amidst the Snows,” written in February 1970, Moroz argued for the need to stand up and be counted whenever human and constitutional rights are threatened in one’s country.⁴

As soon as the essay reached different regions of the Ukraine,

in uncensored copies, the KGB brought the author to the bar and put him behind the bars of a prison. Sentence: nine years plus five years of banishment from the Ukraine.

The second sentencing of Valentyn Moroz—on Nov. 17, 1970—shook the conscience of thousands of young people in the USSR and all over the world.

The sentence (one of the harshest of this kind in the post-Stalin Soviet Union) was pronounced by a court that had failed to produce a single witness for the prosecution.

Chornovil, Dzyuba and a senior writer, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, had been forced to appear at the trial as material witnesses. All three refused to testify against Moroz because the trial was a closed one and thus, in their opinion, illegal in terms of both the Soviet Union's and the Soviet Ukraine's laws.

Wife Dismissed

"In Stalin's time, I myself had been convicted twice in the same manner and by a closed court like this one; once I was even sentenced to death. I won't have any part in inflicting the same injustice upon Moroz," declared Antonenko-Davydovych, an undaunted veteran of Soviet prisons.

Moroz's defense attorney, E. M. Kogan, who defended A. Siniavsky in 1966, has proven that his client's activities had been entirely within the Soviet law.

Moroz's wife, Raisa, stressed the same point in her appeal to Petro Shelest, the Communist boss of the Ukraine and the man who had bullied the Czechoslovak leaders at the fateful meeting at Cierna on the Tisa in 1968. She wrote with a subtle irony:

For four years I with my little son had been waiting for my husband, and the boy's father, to return home from the imprisonment which was inflicted upon him—as many people say—for more than dubious reasons. Now again, we are facing long years of separation. . . . Is this really necessary for the construction of the most just and humane society in the world?

For all her efforts, Mrs. Moroz was dismissed from her

teaching job by the time her husband had been transferred to the prison at Vladimir this past January.

As it is, many a Canadian may wonder about the high stakes of free thinking in the Soviet Union.

Others may ask: What significance does such resistance have if even people in the civilized world often are not aware of the dissident's feat?

But it is a fact that the young dissenters like Moroz have definitely shattered the weirdest of the Soviet myths: that there ever existed a homo Sovieticus, a truly Soviet man.

In spite of all the endeavors by the Kremlin rulers for more than 50 years—and at a shocking cost in human lives—the Ukrainians, the Jews, the Lithuanians and even Russians themselves (as witnessed by A. Solzhenitsyn) are successfully resisting the attempts at remodelling them into the programmed cogs in human forms.

Or, as Valentyn Moroz put it: "In the last decade, for the first time and to the great surprise of the KGB, public opinion has arisen."

Herein lies the significance of Moroz's self-sacrifice: the huge empire of cogs is rocking because this human cog would not keep silent.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹Valentyn Ia. Moroz (b. 1936), Ukrainian historian, arrested in 1965 at the age of 29 for protesting Russification of the Ukraine, sentenced to five years in a severe-regime labor camp. Released in 1969, he was arrested again in 1970 for his criticism of the Soviet nationality policy in the Ukraine; he was sentenced to 14 years — six years imprisonment, three years severe-regime labor camp, and five years in Siberian exile. Reported near death in 1974 as a result of a 20-week hunger strike to protest prison conditions, which led Andrei Sakharov, Soviet dissident physicist to appeal on his behalf to Soviet President Brezhnev and President Carter. Moroz became a leading figure in the Ukrainian dissident movement and a symbol of the Ukrainian national liberation movement in the seventies. He was released on April 27, 1979 together with four other Soviet dissidents in an

“exchange” for two convicted Soviet spies and now resides in the United States.

²For a complete text of the essay, see *Boomerang; the Works of Valentyn Moroz*, ed. by Ya. Bihun (Baltimore, Md.: Smoloskyp Pub., 1974), pp. 7-60.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 91-124.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 63-89.

27

STALINISM REAPPEARS IN THE UKRAINE COLONY

The Windsor Star Editor's Note—*Since its formation 50 years ago this year, the Soviet Union, which consists of 15 constitutionally sovereign republics, has been plagued by an apparently insoluble problem: the aspirations of its various nationalities to become real masters in their own republics.*

Thus, the Kremlin rulers are facing today the same specter of nationalism Lenin and Stalin did in their days. But the issue has become even more complicated for them by recent demands of many Russians themselves for granting human rights to all the Soviet citizens.

The complexity of the dual problem—nationalism and human rights—is reflected best in the events that recently took place in the Ukraine and which are analysed in the following article.

Petro Shelest,¹ the little emperor of the Soviet Ukraine, may not be aware of it, but he is naked. Not that he ever was disrobed by some ethnic Canadian with a personal or ideological grudge against representatives of the new Soviet class.

Isolated as he is from the West, Shelest must know Canada to be a nice country to live in but too hazardous for him to enter-

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tain any thought of visiting it. For here dwell far too many Ukrainian-Canadians who are keenly aware of the injustices perpetrated on their kith and kin in the Ukraine.

By now, however, even those in the two countries sprawled along the 50th parallel, who had cherished some elusive hopes for a more humane treatment of the Ukrainians under the post-Stalin regime, have been brutally awakened by recent arrests in Kiev and Lviv.

Nineteen young intellectuals in these two main cities of the Ukraine were put behind bars in January and many more have been subjected to house searches and interrogations by the KGB, the Soviet internal security police.

The action came in the wake of Shelest's public call to party workers for ideological vigilance against those who allegedly are bent on undermining Soviet rule in the Ukraine, the second largest Soviet republic with a population of 47 million.

Shelest, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, is known as one of the more ruthless Soviet leaders. He became notorious in the West after the historic meetings between the Soviet Politburo and Czechoslovak leaders at Cierna on the Tisa and Moscow, in 1968. There, he furiously attacked Dr. F. Kriegel—the only Jew on the Dubcek Presidium—for his pro-Western liberal ideas.

Zest on Hatchet Job

Of course, Shelest acted on the orders of Brezhnev who chose for the occasion the role of a benevolent supremo who leaves a hatchet job to his underlings, as Stalin used to leave his to Kaganovich and Molotov.

But Shelest did his job with gusto and some inner conviction because he was seriously worried about any untoward influence of a 140,000-strong Ukrainian minority in Czechoslovakia on his own 40 million Ukrainian subjects.

The latter had been jealously eyeing the freedoms of thought and action just acquired by their brethren in Czechoslovakia. To stem the ferment from eroding the foundations of his not so little empire, Shelest eagerly cast his vote in the Politburo for sealing

off Czechoslovakia—that historic gateway from West to East Europe—by an intervention of the Soviet Army.

And in order to placate about 800,000 students in the Soviet Ukraine, Shelest's establishment allowed them to prepare and hold a mass rally of their representatives in Kiev for the purpose of discussing youth issues of the decade.

Being the first (and last) discussion rally of Soviet students ever held in any Soviet republic, the Kiev three-day meeting in February 1969 was primarily designed to prevent the more dissatisfied among the less timid younger generation from swelling the ranks of active Ukrainian dissidents.

The ruse apparently failed as did the administrative measures introduced with the same objective in mind: the tightening of control on passenger traffic between Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine; the intimidation of Ukrainian visitors from countries in which a Ukrainian minority enjoys a dignified status (Canada, U.S., Yugoslavia and even Poland); official pressure on Russia's university graduates to settle in the Ukraine while Ukrainian graduates could find employment mostly outside their own republic—in the Asian parts of the USSR.

But all that only tended to underscore the subservience of the Kiev establishment to the Kremlin centralists at a time when Soviet youth had already lost its faith in both communist dogma and the Soviet kind of federalism.

Consequently, numerous uncensored pamphlets, appeals, political and literary essays circulated hand to hand with a growing persistence.

A bulletin, *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* (The Ukrainian Herald) began to appear, bringing uncensored news about the officially unpublicized events in the Ukraine.²

This phenomenon closely resembled the one in the Russian Federation or those in the Baltic countries, with the former being more known and appreciated in the West.

And like his Russian or Baltic counterparts, a Soviet Ukrainian youth of today is loathe to look into the *Izvestia* of Moscow (The News) for hard news items or to search for some truth in the *Pravda Ukrainy* (The Truth of Ukraine).

He prefers finding his own sources of information, unpolluted by official interpretation; and he likes confronting his own views with the opinions held by unofficial persons.

In this manner, a semblance of independent public opinion has crystallized there in spite of the oppressive censorship.

To what degree, however, has this movement of minds in the Soviet Ukraine been influenced by the Ukrainians residing abroad?

The existence of well-organized Ukrainian communities in North America, Britain, Australia, France and Latin American countries has been a positive challenge to the independent-minded Soviet Ukrainians rather than a directive factor. As it is, an essential gap exists between the views held by Soviet Ukrainian patriots and those of the Ukrainian emigres with their descendants included.

Sincerity Brought Wrath

The emigres, almost without exception, oppose the idea that a viable sovereign Ukraine could be reconstituted on the Marxist-Leninist formula which is expounded and defended by all the spokesmen of Soviet Ukrainian dissent.

It is one of the major ironies of Soviet existence that it was Ivan Dzyuba, one of these recently arrested by the KGB dissenters, who had presented the definitive concept of that Leninist formula.

In his scholarly study *Internationalism or Russification?* that appeared in print only outside the USSR (in Ukrainian and English editions), Dzyuba contrasted the current Soviet practices in the Ukraine with the Marxist-Leninist theory of equality of nationalities in a communist system.

The practice has been roughly the same as under the Russian czars: to Russify all the nationalities of the Soviet Union.

Dzyuba made an ardent appeal to the Kiev leadership to return to the true Marxist-Leninist concept of internationalism as the only means of providing for the Ukrainian people equal status with the Soviet Russians, and of eliminating the entrenched chauvinism in the inter-ethnic relations there.

The sincere effort of Dzyuba brought only the establishment's wrath upon his head. But what particularly strikes an observer of the Ukrainian dissent movement is the self-confidence of its spokesmen. They seem to practise love of truth without fear.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, who was instructed by the state TV

network to prepare an official version of the secret trial of a group of dissidents at Lviv in 1966, produced from his notes a striking document for the public—20 portraits of courage: the cases of the accused Ukrainian dissenters. (His book appeared in English translation in Toronto, 1968.) For this he served a two-year prison term.

Dissenters Jailed

Undaunted, Chornovil recently protested against willful destruction of the Ukrainian soldiers' cemeteries and war memorials by the Soviet administration at Lviv. In January, he was promptly re-arrested.

Another dissenter Anton Koval of Chernihiv, appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in Kiev to restore the armed forces to Soviet Ukraine because, according to the constitution, the republic is supposed to have its own department of defense and should be represented at the Warsaw Pact councils.

Svyatoslav Karavansky of Odessa, now serving a 25-year prison term, was the first man in the Soviet Union to raise the case of small nationalities—the Jews, the Tartars, the Baltic peoples, the Moldavians, the Volga Germans, etc.

He appealed to the Communist parties of the world to formulate a charter of human rights for these peoples, along with the Ukrainians and Belorussians as a guarantee against the Russian preponderance. His wife Nina refused to abandon him to his own fate and continued appealing for a review of his case. For this she was arrested in the January round-up of Ukrainian dissenters.

Valentyn Moroz, a historian who became a subject of controversy even on Parliament Hill in Ottawa last Spring, is now serving his 14-year term in Russia. In his last address to his judges he wrote:

If by putting me behind the bars you hope to create a vacuum in the Ukrainian resurgence, then you are mistaken. You must comprehend one thing: there won't be any vacuum there. The intensity of the Ukraine's spiritual potential is already sufficient to fill out any vacuum and to

produce new civic leaders for taking over the tasks of the imprisoned and of those who had left the public arena.³

Volodyslav Nedobora⁴ of Kharkiv has availed himself of a statement by a 19th century Russian dissenter Chaadaev when he was faced with a similar set of official demands for blind obedience to the rulers: "I have not learned to love my fatherland with closed eyes, bowed head and closed mouth. I believe that a person can only be helpful to his country when he sees clearly. I believe that the era of blind compliance with the laws is now past."

Youth Dropouts

What is more, all the dissenters have protested against the traditional practice of punishing Ukrainian citizens by sending them to prisons and concentration camps or compulsory settlement in Russia, as such a practice was another proof of the Ukraine being a colony.

It is evident then that all these Soviet Ukrainians felt no great need for any inspiration from abroad to grow up into as complete human beings as was possible under these conditions.

The realization of this fact must have come as a shock to Shelest and his like: the Soviet system, renowned for its ability of indoctrinating young minds, is beset by the problem of "drop-outs" from the system.

But being a true Soviet bureaucrat, he would explain this inherent malady of the Kremlin system solely by external reasons.

In his harangue to the ideological activists in Kiev last November, Shelest blamed foreign radio broadcasts and other media for the split of personality in the Soviet Ukrainian society.

These mass media have been partially successful, he said, because they addressed their subversive idea to Soviet youth who "have not gone through the school of class struggle and have not acquired sufficient ideological training at work and at school."⁵

Moreover, a recent alliance between the Zionists and the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists is another factor in the process, he said.

The Rattle of Chains

But Shelest's accusation was not the first one of the kind levelled at the Ukrainians who—like Karavansky, Dzyuba or Moroz—dared to stand up for the persecuted Jews and for understanding of their mutual tribulations in the Soviet cauldron of nationalities.

As early as August 1970, V. Bolshakov devoted his two-part article in the Moscow *Komsomolskaia Pravda*⁶ to the charge that various Western sovietologists—such as Professor Labeledz of London, Professor Brzezinski of Columbia University, and this writer—were busy spreading the Zionist philosophy of cosmopolitanism and ideological nihilism.

Even though this kind of writing was not on the level, it still represented a debate in the struggle for the minds of Soviet youths who had been searching for new ideas and some more humane practices of self-government.

But after November 1971 Shelest's speech and the subsequent harsh sentencing of Russian dissenter V. Bukovsky,⁷ even these words have been drowned in the rattle of prison chains.

So gone are the days when Comrade Shelest would strike a pose of an enlightened bureaucrat who deemed it necessary to admonish publicly even the Soviet Ukrainian Writers' Union. He said it was the members' sacred duty to develop the Ukrainian culture and preserve the Ukrainian language in the republic.

Gone are the days when his propaganda men would project him as an efficient administrator of the huge republic in which Ukrainians are living without ever dreaming of a breakaway from their "older brother"—the Russian people.

Ukraine Like a Colony

In those years, 1967–1971, communist followers in such countries as Canada would take heart from Shelest's "soft approach" to the thorny Ukrainian problem in the USSR.

In the imagination of Ukrainian-Canadian communists, few as they are today, the Soviet Ukraine seemed to be shaping itself into a sovereign state whose representatives at the United Nations appeared to feel more and more at home.

And the leadership of Canada's Communist Party breathed somewhat easier after its previous embarrassment over the reported neo-Stalinist practices in the Ukraine.⁸

It was to counter those reports which kept seeping through to the party's membership of Slavic extraction that a special fact-finding mission headed by Tim Buck, was sent in March 1967 to Kiev.

The delegation was reassured by Shelest and lieutenants that all shortcomings, if any, in the republic's life would be remedied.

But the cheering words could not prevent the Canadian observers from noticing what M. Djilas saw during his first visit to Kiev soon after the Second World War: the Ukraine was getting more and more to look like a colony ruled by decree from Moscow rather than by decisions made in Kiev on the basis of the needs of the Ukrainian population.⁹

Today, after the January arrests there, the old specter of Stalinism has re-appeared. Communists and anti-communists alike have come to realize the shocking fact: Petro Shelest is naked like the proverbial Chinese emperor.

But, at least, the naked truth is less confusing than any all-dressed lie. It has been known for some time that Shelest is eyeing a top position in the Kremlin as once did his former chief in the Ukraine, and now president of the USSR, Nikolai Podgorny.

Thus, the present tough line against dissent in the Ukraine only illustrates the unchanging human condition of the Soviet classocrats.

One can hope to reach the main center of decisions there only by divesting oneself of any humanity and by leaving behind all the sentiments one ever had for one's own people.

Once the people have been exploited as a collective stepping stone on the way up the Soviet bureaucratic pyramid, all that is needed is to wrap oneself up in the nakedness of sheer power.

From then on, the faceless KGB dummies remain the only companions of the classocrat until the sudden end of his career or his life. Whichever comes first.

Indeed, there has hardly ever been a greater chasm separating the rulers and the ruled than there is now in the Soviet Union as a whole and in each component republic. The Ukraine is only one of the most striking cases.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See note 2 to article No. 23 in this collection.

²*Ukrains'kyi visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald), a Ukrainian-language clandestine journal, began publishing in early 1970 to provide a vehicle for news about the national democratic movement in the Ukraine and a forum for Ukrainian dissidents. It is the Ukrainian equivalent of the Russian-language *Chronicle of Current Events* (see article No. 24 in this collection). Unlike the latter, however, *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* stresses questions of Ukrainian national rights.

³For a complete text of Moroz's last address at his trial, see *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1974), pp. 1-6.

⁴Volodyslav Nedobora, an engineer; member of the so-called "Kharkov Group" of Soviet Ukrainian dissidents; wrote a letter to the United Nations in defense of the Crimean Tartars (1969); arrested and sentenced to three years of hard labor in 1970.

⁵*Radians'ka Ukraina* (Kiev), November 11, 1971.

⁶V. Bolshakov, "Sketches of an Ideological Front: A Pandora Box," *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, August 25 and 26, 1970.

⁷Vladimir Bukovsky (b. 1942), A Soviet Russian writer; committed to a psychiatric prison in 1965 for organizing a demonstration against the arrests of Siniavsky and Daniel (see note 3 to article No. 13); sentenced in 1967 to three years in a labor camp for organizing a similar demonstration against the arrests of Galanskov and Ginsburg; released in 1967, he documented the abuse of psychiatric treatment of political dissidents, as a result of which he was arrested again in 1971 and sentenced to seven years in prison and five in exile. In 1977, Bukovsky was released and allowed to emigrate in an "exchange" for the Chilean communist leader Luis Corvalán.

⁸See article No. 34 in this collection.

⁹Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), pp. 119-20.

SUPPRESSION IN THE UKRAINE

Of the several hundred Ukrainians of every walk of life imprisoned in the Soviet Union during the first three months of this year, for alleged anti-Soviet propaganda, two may be of special interest to *Gazette* readers. Vyacheslav Chornovil, a Ukrainian TV correspondent, and Ivan Dzyuba, critic and author, were sentenced to twelve and five years imprisonment respectively¹

Their cases make it clear that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime intends to silence a whole generation of Ukrainian sovereignists before the decade of their quiet revolution ends in 1975.

It was in the spring of 1965 that Chornovil took notes at a trial of twenty Ukrainian intellectuals at Lviv district court. Soon after, he made these notes available to Ukrainian readers by means of the "samvydaw" (uncensored self-publishing).

In English, his report of the trial appeared in 1968. *The Gazette* was one of the first Canadian newspapers to comment both on the trial and Chornovil's book.

Recognition

Ivan Dzyuba gained world-wide recognition for his scholarly essay "Internationalism or Russification?" It appeared in print only outside the Soviet Union.

¹Reprinted with permission from *The Gazette* (Montreal), May 3, 1973.

Analyzing the situation in the Ukraine from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, Dzyuba found it wanting in more than one respect. With the help of some irrefutable evidence, he had proven that an outright Russification policy was being applied in every sphere of the Ukraine's life.

That policy, contrary to all that had been said and written by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, threatened the second largest nationality of the Soviet Union with cultural obliteration, Dzyuba wrote.

Meanwhile, "The Chornovil Papers" had laid open the inside machinery of the Soviet judicial system, in which a group of young Ukrainian intellectuals could be arbitrarily arrested and secretly tried for no other reason than deploring the gross acts of the Russification. For their strictly constitutional defense of the right of the Ukrainians to manage their own cultural affairs, these young men and women were sent to prisons and hard-labor camps for up to seven years.

Inadvertently, I became involved in their case because one of my articles, written in Montreal, was used as "evidence" against at least two defendants at the Lviv trial. As witnessed by Chornovil and other sources (both official and unofficial), the prosecution charged that the defendants had acquired, kept, copied, and presumably circulated that article, along with other "foreign anti-Soviet material," among the citizens of the Ukraine.²

Quebec's position of real sovereignty in certain matters was contrasted in the article with the bleak reality in the allegedly sovereign republic of the Ukraine. Although a founding member of the United Nations, the Soviet Ukrainian Republic is ruled by decree from the Kremlin, even in menial matters.

Since that ignominious trial, which was supposed to be secret but became known world-wide and debated by anti-communists and communists alike, the events in the Ukraine have only confirmed the findings of Chornovil and Dzyuba. In spite of their numerical strength as compared with other non-Russian nationalities, the Ukrainian people (over forty million in the Soviet Union) are under twofold pressure, from the centralist Kremlin administration and from the nine-million strong Russian minority that rules the Ukraine in the manner the colons once did in Algeria.

But Chornovil and Dzyuba were not the only ones to see the situation in its true colors. Their publicized stand was but an expression of the resurgent Ukrainian post-Stalin generation that got rid of the paralyzing fear of the "older Russian brother."

Two Trends

How to deal with these dissenters was an issue over which the once powerful Politburo member and Secretary-General of the Ukraine's Communist Party, Petro Shelest, stumbled and fell from power in April 1972.³

His tough treatment of the dissenters, whom he regarded as only the tip of a Ukrainian patriotic iceberg under the murky waters of the Soviet reality, made him extremely unpopular both in the Ukraine and abroad. But having done away with Shelest (partly to please President Nixon, who was about to visit Moscow and Kiev), the Kremlin establishment has retained his policy of unlawful suppression of the young people who were acting within their country's law.

Thus nowadays, the federal KGB resident in Kiev, with a special hotline to the Kremlin, supervises every sector of the Ukraine's life as if it were a region of Russia and not a constituent republic of the Soviet Union.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹At the time of publication of this article, there were various reports circulating in the Soviet Union and abroad concerning Dzyuba's fate. After his arrest and detention, Dzyuba was released in 1973 upon publishing a "recantation." See note 6 to article No. 12 in this collection.

²See article No. 21 in this collection.

³See note 2 to article No. 23 in this collection.

SPIRIT UNDER OPPRESSION

I remember him clearly. He was five when the Nazis were ravaging the Ukraine.

Oblivious of danger, barefoot, carefree, Ihor Kalynets would chase the frisky, impudent hares through the golden-tinged fields under a genial blue sky. Or, making himself useful (as he thought), he threw pebbles like marbles at the crows which from the treetops were keeping an optimistic look-out for small stray fowl.

Now Ihor is 34, a poet, and in a Soviet jail.

Those Europeans who formed (under the patronage of the Nobel prize laureate René Cassin, in June 1971) an international committee for the defense of human rights in the USSR, claim that the Soviet "hard-labor camps" alone hold over one million men and women.

In his paper presented to the plenary session held in Brussels last February, Professor Peter Reddaway, of the London School of Economics, also pointed out that very large numbers of prisoners are being kept in jails, psychiatric wards, and areas of compulsory settlement. These, both in European and Asiatic Russia, are not accounted for.

In that nightmarish phantom category are Ihor and his wife Iryna.

Tried secretly and separately under the cover-all charge of being a party to "anti-Soviet propaganda," they were sentenced

to six and nine years' imprisonment respectively plus three years in exile each.

Their infant daughter is being taken care of by relatives whose fate is as uncertain as that of any Soviet citizen linked in any way to a person under the "temporary care of the police authorities."

What "crime" have the Kalynets committed?

Could it have been Ihor's boyish chase of a nationalized hare in one of the Ukraine's kolkhozes?

Was it the throwing of pebbles at state-owned crows?

The poet's "crime" was compounded by his love for the Ukraine and his openly expressed desire to promote a three-dimensional concept of Ukrainian identity in a society where everybody is obliged, at least to pretend, to be one-dimensional . . . a non-entity.

Ihor, one of the more talented Ukrainian poets, is read both in the Ukraine and in the Ukrainian diaspora.

Tradition meshes in his verses with the contemporary aspirations of Ukraine's youth: Their longing for uncensored self-expression in art and everyday life . . . their claim for human rights both on behalf of the inhabitants of the Ukraine without discrimination, and for authentic self-government.

These are all legitimate aspirations and pursuits even in the USSR — at least on paper.

Kalynets' poems, however, reached their readers through longhand, private transcripts in the pre-Gutenberg tradition rather than through the official printing presses.

His two collections of poetry, "stalled" or rejected by Soviet censors, have been published abroad. They are available in North America.¹

The earlier collection of poems, entitled *The Opening of a Christmas Theater*, is enhanced by woodcuts—the work of a young artist born in prison, Bohdan Soroka, who somehow developed his talent in concentration camps.

His father, the architect Mykhailo Soroka, died before completing his 25-year term, in the hard-labor camp of Dubrovlag, Russia, last year.

Some recent immigrants to Israel from the Soviet Union (Avraam Shifrin, for example), remember Soroka as a man of integrity and a defender of prisoners' rights in Vorkuta and other places of detention.²

Kateryna Soroka (Mykhailo's wife and Bohdan's mother) was recently released from the same hard-labor camp after her own 25-year term.

Although she was kept in a camp close to the plot in which her husband Mykhailo has been buried, she was not informed of his death.

Only a number — not a name — marks his grave. Months later, prisoners brought the wife the news from another camp, says the Russian-language *Khronika*.

Thus, the arrest and the nine-year term of compound imprisonment of Ihor Kalynets' wife is no exception in the country which officially, every March, celebrates Women's Day.

But what puzzles an observer of the Soviet scene is the lack of justification for her sentence.

Iryna Kalynets' "crime" consisted of her giving moral support to her husband's ideas about the preservation of the identity of the Soviet Ukrainian, a citizen of the empire of the one-dimensional.

She had compassion for the Ukrainian patriots (intellectuals, workers, and kolkhoz peasants) imprisoned by "authority." She also dared express her indignation in such cases as that of historian Valentyn Moroz.

Moroz's name is known to many Canadians. It was brought to the attention of Canada's parliamentarians and its government in 1971, in connection with two diplomatic visits—Prime Minister Trudeau's to the Soviet Union and Premier Kosygin's to Canada.

A strong humanist, Valentyn Moroz was imprisoned for the second time in the autumn of 1970. The term: 14 years' imprisonment and banishment from the Ukraine.

According to recent reports, some unidentified common criminals allegedly with the connivance of the authorities of the Vladimir prison in Russia, set upon him with knives.

As to the esteem in which this defender of human rights is held by the young Ukrainians, witness the lines dedicated to Moroz by Ihor Kalynets in his more recent collection of poems. They read:

*I wish this book
were to you, for an instant at
least,
Veronica's cloth on the road
to Calvary.*

*I wish this book
like Veronica's cloth, reminded
us
of the grace
of your face.*

Taking the key from Ihor Kalynets' verse, I too wish I could reach readers with the following words:

Ihor Kalynets does not remember me. I never saw his wife. I did not meet Bohdan Soroka. He was born and grew up in captivity. I knew, however, his mother when she was a student and already a Ukrainian patriot.

But writing about them today in Canada, I perhaps immodestly wish this article were like St. Veronica's cloth to my fellow North Americans, reminding them of those striving to retain their spirit under oppression.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See, Ihor Kalynets, *Poezii z Ukrainy* (Poems from Ukraine), (Bruxelles: 1970); and *Pidsumovuiuchy movchannia* (Reassessing Silence), (Munich: 1971).

²Avraam Shifrin, *Chetvertyi vymir* (The Fourth Dimension), (Munich: Suchasnist, 1973), pp. 307-309. Shifrin, sentenced to 25 years by Soviet authorities as an "Israeli-American spy"; spent 10 years in Soviet concentration camps and 3 years in enforced exile; released in 1966, and in 1970 emigrated to Israel.

UKRAINIANS VIEW CANADA AS THE LAST HAVEN

What with inflation, taxes and strikes which make many Canadians somewhat uneasy in their own country, Canada still remains about the only haven of good hope for quite a few people in Eastern Europe.

Recently, at least two Ukrainian prisoners of conscience in Russia's hard labor camps and prisons have renounced their Soviet citizenship and asked the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to permit them to emigrate to Canada.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, 38-year-old radio and TV journalist, tried twice and sentenced to two separate prison terms on the convenient charge of "waging anti-Soviet propaganda," is known to quite a few Canadians. His book containing collected letters, petitions and protests of 20 Ukrainian intellectuals, appeared in English seven years ago nowhere else but in Toronto.¹

The book revealed to Canadian readers that there existed a spiritual link between the Soviet Ukrainians and Ukrainian-Canadians in their mutual desire to preserve both Ukrainian culture and identity. Canada, with its fair treatment of the French fact, appeared to the Ukrainian freethinkers a convincing example of a practical solution to any confron-

Reprinted with permission from *The Winnipeg Tribune*, January 17, 1976.

tation of different ethno-cultural entities within a larger structure.

Even for these modest thoughts the young freethinkers were arrested, tried, and sentenced to harsh terms of imprisonment and banishment from the Ukraine. Vyacheslav Chornovil was tried later on for having refused to testify falsely against some of the accused.

Re-arrested

After having spent three years in a prison, Chornovil was released. But, in January, 1972, he was re-arrested together with several hundred other Ukrainian intellectuals, students and workers who opposed the Kremlin policy of a Soviet melting cauldron.

The extent of these arrests and the severity of sentences prompted some observers to charge that the KGB (Soviet secret police) was intent on making a "cultural desert in the Ukraine" from which every year thousands of professional people are being sent out to remote regions of Russia anyway.

In his letter to the Supreme Soviet, Chornovil charged that he was "physically tortured" by the secret police. "Ill, weakened by my hunger strike, I was shackled and then kept outside in the frost, naked, for over three hours."

This has not deterred him from informing the Supreme Soviet of his intention to emigrate: "I have already appealed to the Canadian Government to grant me Canadian citizenship and to take steps towards my release and my departure from the USSR. But I have no doubts that the (prison) authorities have not had it forwarded."

Chornovil did not renounce his spiritual Ukrainian citizenship.

"I will, in the event of a change of my citizenship, continue to consider myself a citizen of the Ukraine, to which I shall return as soon as Ukrainian patriotism is no longer considered a crime there and is removed from under the 'supervision' of the KGB."

The case of another prisoner, Danylo L. Shumuk, is more complicated, although he has some relatives in Canada. Shumuk, a former member of the Komsomol (Soviet youth organization), went over to the Ukrainian nationalist insurgents

during the Second World War and upon its conclusion was arrested by the Soviet police.

He served about 10 years for that "interlude" in his life, was amnestied and then arrested again for writing his "memoirs." Since January 1972, he has been in a prison camp.

Danylo Shumuk has also asked the Supreme Soviet to relieve him of Soviet citizenship and let him emigrate to Canada. In the meantime, his relatives in Canada have brought his case to the attention of the Canadian Government.

"Having been deprived of my freedom and my Motherland (Ukraine), I have no need for the citizenship, because without freedom and a homeland that citizenship is superfluous for me," explained Shumuk in his letter a few months ago.

Others Join In

Copies of these letters written by the two prisoners have been delivered from hand to hand in the Ukraine for some time, and recently they have reached the people in this country as well. But Chornovil and Shumuk are not the only ones who have expressed, in writing, their confidence in Canada.

In addition to a number of Ukrainian prisoners, some prominent Russians did the same. Alexander Solzhenitsyn visited Canada a few months ago to look for a suitable place to settle. Reportedly, he liked what he saw here.

"Last Refuge"

And former Stalin prize winner Viktor Nekrasov, while on a Canadian tour last April, told me: "Canada seems to be the last refuge for the freedom-thirsty people of Eastern Europe."

All these statements are echoing an observation made by a prominent Soviet chemist, Mykhailo Klochko, back in 1961, during an International Congress of Chemists in Montreal. He said: "I think, I would forego even the United States for Canada if and when I had a choice."

Two days later, in Ottawa, he asked for asylum in this country and was granted it.

Freedom to travel or settle in the land of your liking, is now as important as freedom of speech and belief to many of these people.

It is on the minds of millions standing on the shores of expectations in the countries of their unwanted, compulsory citizenship. But what made Canada loom large and, perhaps, even "sublime" in their thoughts, was twofold.

The freedom of choice this country has been offering to all its citizens in every walk of life and regardless of cultural background; and the persistent campaign waged by Canada's representatives at various international forums, including the Helsinki Conference for a speedy application of the principle of free movement of people, ideas, and information across all national borders.

By an unexplained human osmosis, the news about Canada and her stand on human rights has penetrated deep into the closed Soviet society and evoked an unexpected response even among prisoners.²

REFERENCE NOTES

¹See article No. 22 in this collection.

²Soviet reaction to this article, though belated, appeared in a paper published in Donbas, the industrial region of the Soviet Ukraine. See Ie. Korchagin, "A Haven for War Criminals," *Vechernyi Donetsk*, August 17, 1978.

THE TALE OF TWO ARCHIPELAGOS

Two distinct archipelagos of human misery and compassion coexist along the fiftieth parallel that spans Canada and the Soviet Union.

Thousands of people living freely on their ethno-cultural islands across Canada are tied together by invisible threads to their kin on the "islands" of the Soviet penal system now known as GULAG.¹

Only rarely a voiceless letter "from beyond" manages to reach the inhabitants on this side of the invisible divide. But every time it does, it shakes their lives like a private earthquake.

You may not be aware of it, but a close neighbor of yours may be one of those "Fridays" from whom some "Robinson" on a Soviet penal island is expecting a letter, in vain.

Like Evhen Pryshliak who has relatives both in Montreal and Toronto.

Now 62 and an inmate in a forced labor camp of Perm, in the Urals, Pryshliak spent half of his lifetime in the prisons of powers which overrun the Ukraine, Poland, Germany, and Russia.

A strong believer in human rights and sovereignty for every nationality under the sun, Evhen Pryshliak opposed the Nazi

Written for and distributed by the Southam News Services, this article appeared in several newspapers across Canada. Here it is reprinted with permission of the Southam News Services and the *Edmonton Journal* (March 6, 1976).

Germans almost from the moment they entered the West Ukrainian city of Lviv, at the end of June 1941.

For this he was arrested and would have found death either there or in one of the concentration camps of Germany if the Ukrainian underground had not sprung him out of the Lviv prison.

I saw him fleetingly during that interlude of his free life when he was urging his nationalist colleagues to help liberate Jewish medics and mechanics from the ghettos in various Ukrainian towns. The newly formed armed detachments of Ukrainian insurgents felt a dearth of such personnel. And his advice was put into practice more than once, and with good results.

The re-occupation of the Ukraine by Stalin's armed forces in the summer of 1944 did not cool off Evhen Pryshliak's revolutionary ardor. He was one of those who managed to keep up the flame of the Ukrainian liberation movement well beyond Stalin's demise and into the period of his successor Nikita Khrushchev.

Reportedly, it was the notorious English journalist-turned-Kremlin-spy, Kim Philby, who contributed to the destruction of the underground network in the Carpathian mountains region, then under Pryshliak's supervision.

But the speculations aside, Evhen Pryshliak withstood all the pressures and temptations of the Kremlin security machine. Never would he become a "linear man" of the Soviet mold.

Former Soviet prisoners, such as Avraam Shifrin² of Israel or the Lithuanian seaman Simas Kudirka³ who spent some time with Evhen Pryshliak in the system of GULAG archipelago, speak highly of his integrity.

"Evhen Pryshliak has remained a three-dimensional human being in spite of the harsh treatment allotted to him by his jailors," Simas Kudirka told me during his brief visit to Montreal a few months ago.

It is not easy to achieve such a dignified status among numerous prisoners and under the terrible conditions in the Soviet prisons and camps described by Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

When re-reading Evhen Pryshliak's letter to his Montreal relatives a few days ago, I hardly sensed a shade of self-pity in his words.

Perhaps you too have joined those who have decided not to write to me because this might jeopardize my legal release upon the completion of my term. . . .

Of course, I realize that some of the letters addressed to me might have been seized by the administration (of the camp). But anyway, it is well-nigh impossible for a prisoner to further his own case because his life conditions are entirely independent of him. . . . Moreover, one cannot simply cast off one's own half lifetime, to say the least. . . .

Well put, indeed. Particularly by someone who, at 62, after three prison terms under three different foreign regimes has still preserved human dignity and faith in humanity.

Evhen Pryshliak's 25-year term is due to run out, legally speaking, in 1977. His relatives in Canada, like the relatives of other Soviet political prisoners, have a tormented life. They are torn between a desire to do something on his behalf and their caution lest these attempts at intercession impair his chances for survival and possible legal release.

But the prisoners on the Soviet archipelago neither falter in their determination nor are they aware of such a dilemma. Thus recently about 80 of them went on hunger strike; and 25 Ukrainian dissenters imprisoned in forced labor camps of Russia officially renounced their Soviet citizenship. Two of them declared they want to emigrate to Canada.

And from those living on the "free archipelago" of Canada and elsewhere, they demand to raise their voices of protest against the mistreatment of political prisoners in the Soviet Union.

Together with the recently released mathematician Leonid Plyushch,⁴ they seem to believe in Robert Burns' dictum that man's inhumanity to man ought to make countless mourn; and protest.

That is, on both archipelagos of human misery and compassion along the fiftieth parallel which spans the two countries divided by the Arctic Sea—Canada and Soviet Union.

So similar and so infinitely different.

REFERENCE NOTES

¹GULAG—*Glavnoie upravleniie ispravitel'no-trudovykh lageri* (The Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps), a Soviet government agency in charge of the penal system—the concentration camps, where both criminal and political prisoners are kept. This acronym was used by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, himself a former inmate of these camps, for his multi-volume world-famous work *The Gulag Archipelago* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973-76), 3 vols.

²See note 2 to article No. 29.

³Simas Kudirka, a Lithuanian seaman who jumped the Soviet fishing boat in Boston harbor and was handed back to the Soviets by the US Coast Guard. Tried for treason and sentenced to death, which was commuted to 10 years of imprisonment, Kudirka was released when it was established that he was a former US citizen. He now lives in the United States.

⁴Leonid Plyushch, a mathematician-cyberneticist and a Ukrainian dissident; for his active participation in the civil rights movement in the Ukraine and the USSR, was sentenced to an indefinite term in a special psychiatric hospital (a form of Soviet punishment for political dissidents); released after three years (1973-76), and allowed to emigrate; he now lives in Western Europe.